Abstract: Beginning with a sketch of the major mo ral ideas contained in just war tradition, this essay applies them to three controverted issues in contemporary military debate: nuclear deterrence strategy, the strategic defense initiati ve, and the possibility of building and deploying fractional megatonnage nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles of extremely high accuracy. lt is argued that, in terms of the criteria of just war tradition, deterrence in its present form poses grave moral problems. The two new weapons systems are then examined in terms of whether, by just war criteria, they represent more moral means of defense than contemporary nuclear deterrence. lntroduction Moral Analysis of warfare is never done once and for oll time, since the phenomenon of war itself never stands still for long. Weapons change, alliances among nations wax ond wane, domestic political attitudes and material conditions moy be transformed within the societies of prospective belligerents. It is one thing to apply moral analysis -itself far from an exact science -to a state of affair s t hat obtained in the post, so as to enter the deba te, for example, over the justice or injustice of the strategic bombing campaigns of World War li. lt is quite another thing to apply the same sort of moral analysis to the possibilities that war may -or may notbring in a future that can never be glimpsed in its fullness from a perspective in the present.
The purpose of this essay is to bring to bear on certain recen t strategic developments in the East-West power relation a moral analysis rooted in the perspectives of just war tradition. Specifically, I will comment critically on the presen t shape of United Stetes nuclear strategy , then on two new strategic developments possessing the potential to change this current strategic posture decisively: the Strategie Defense Initiative and research and development aimed toward producing fractional megatonnage nuclear weapons of ext remely high accuracy.
The Just War Concept
The te r m "just war" conveys somewhot different ideos to different people. As I employ t his term, it refers to o brood morol trodition thot hos developed in western culture os o result of the Interaction of certoin religious ond seculor forces, principolly Christion theologicol ethics ond conon low, seculor low both domestic ond international, the proctice of relotion s omong stetes, an d the trodition s of p rofessionol militor y life. While the deepest roots of this trodition ore to be found in the Hebroic ond Groeco-Romon ontecedents to western culture ond in eorly Christion thought, we know it todoy substontiolly in the conceptuol form thot was given just war doctrine in the lote Middle Ages ond the eorly modern period. In thot form the concept of just war is developed under two rubrics, the jus od bellum, hoving to do with when it is just to resort to orms, ond the jus in bello, hoving to do with whot Iimits ought to be observed in fighting justly. The fo rmer includes, moximolly, seven ideos: thot there must be just couse for resort to orms, thot there must be due politicol outhority for the decision to toke orms, thot the Intention in doing so mus t be correct, thot the good done by protection of volues in this woy mus t exceed the horm, thot there must be o reosonoble hope of success in the decision to toke orms, thot this decision must be o lost resort, ond thot the end sought must be o renewed stete of peoce. The jus in bello includes two mojor ideos: thot noncombotonts should be spored direct, intentional horm, ond thot disproportionotely destructive force should be ovoided in the conduct of hostilities (for more on these cotegories ond their historicol development see my ond 1981 , further Russell 1975 , O'Brien 1981 , Romsey 1961 ).
The specific content ossigned to eoch of these cotegories hos voried somewhot over time ond occording to the context oddressed by porticulor elements within the averoll trodition . Themas Aq uinos in the thirteenth century, for exomple, identified three types of just cause: punishment of evil, repelling of an injury in progress (defense), ond the need to recover something wrongly token (Summa 11/ll, Quest. XL, Art. 1). Just war historion Alfred Vonderpol, commenting on Thomos's doctrine, orgues thot the punishment of evil was preeminent omong these, ond further thot it remoined the primory notion of just couse in church teoching throughout the Middle Ages ( Vonderpol 1919, 250 ff.) . By controst, in twentiethcentury international low the ideo of defense is cleorly the preeminent concept.
1 While it con be orgued thot the definition of defense con reosonobly be stretched to include the other two ideos enumeroted by Thomos, 2 the most striking development in twentieth-century thought on the justificotion of war is the extension of the cotegory of defense to cover strotegic nucleor retoliotion. Whether deterrence by threot of retoliotion is genuinely defense is o mojor morol issue roised by SDI, os we sholl see below.
Alongside such particular changes as the concept of just cause there has been something of a sea change within the jus ad bellum of just war tradition as a whole. While medieval and early modern theorists treated the categories of just cause, right authority, and right intention as more important than the other jus ad bellum ideas, contemporary moral concerns have tended to stress precisely those concepts paid little attention by these earlier theorists: proportionality, last resort, the restorotion of peoceful relotions in the international community. While this implicit prioritizotion of the jus od bellum ideos con be found in mojor ecclesiostical stotements of position (notobly the orgument of the Americon Cotholic bishops in their 1983 postoral Ietter, The Chollenge of Peace) , the principo reasons for the shift of emphasis lies, I om convinced, in the nature of modern international law, which hos constituted o mojor vehicle for development of just war thought and proctice since the time of Grotius. In the international low redoction of just war trodition the existence of sovereign politicol entities is token for gronted, ond there is no ottempt to judge the rightness or wrongness of the governing outhority of ony particulor one of them. Right outhority thus becomes the competence de guerre enjoyed by the ruling person or body of ony Independent stote. Just couse devolves into defense ogoinst ottock -norrowly understood os firing the second shot in response to the first shot olreody fired by an ottocker -ond right intention thus is defined implicitly as thot of defending ogoinst ottock. With the exception of the definition of just couse in terms of defense, international law poys little or no ottention to these ~ od bell um cotegories. By cantrast, international low has o mojor interest in mointoining the stotus quo of relotions omong notions, ond this Ieads to greoter ottention to the effort to minimize or eliminote ony resort to ormed force ( the ju st war concept of lost resort) fou nd in the Leog ue of Notions Covenont, the estoblishment of the World Court, the Poet of Paris, ond the United Notions Charter. The just war cotegory of the end of peoce, redefined os the restorotion of o tolerable stobility among notions without use of ormed force, follows from the some concerns. The stress on considerotions of proportionality -counting the likely averoll costs of on ormed conflict ond weighing them ogoinst the goods to be defended -hos been in !arge port o result of reflection on the destructiveness of modern war, and porticulorly since 1945, of nucleor war. 3
In the jus in bello the concepts of noncombatont protection ond proportionolity in the sense of matehing Ievel of force employed to the desired gool hove, in general, risen in importonce relative to the jus od bellum over time. Some contemporory critics of military preporedness hove orgued thot war todoy is inherently unjust becouse it can never meet these jus in bello criterio (see, for exomple, Geyer 1982 , 191 -93, ond Yoder 1984 . This is in shorp cantrast to the main line of just war tradition, even todoy, which regords these ju s in bello criterio os coming into ploy only ofter the initiol dec_ision has been mode thot o resort to ormed conflict is justified ( Brien 1981 1 chs. 3 ond 8 explicitly mokes this point ) . Certoinly it is necessory to soy thot morol considerotion of whether o prospective use of ormed force will be just requires toking occou nt of jus in bello concerns; this is not the some 1 though 1 os soying thot the lotter should domlnote or over r ule the former.
Where do we stand -or ought we to stand -todoy relative to this trodition on the justificotion ond Iimitation of war? lt mu s t be soid first thot for the moin line of western cultu r e 1 there is reolly no getting owoy from either the conceptuol cotegories of just war thought or 1 I think 1 the moin line of the content of these cotegories o s this hos consensuolly developed over the centuries. While some criticol voices cantend todoy thot just war thinking is irrelevant to the nucleor oge 1 the foct is thot the concept s ond content of this t rodition ore so tightly interwoven with wes tern morol ond politicol concepts ond Ins t itutions os o whole thot we could not reject this one port of the whole fobric without colling in question the rest os weil. Jomes Childress 1 oddressing this chorocter of the ju s t war cotegories 1 orgues thot they ore experienced os imposing prima focie duties on us (1982 1 eh. 3). I would go forther: these cotegories 1 originoting os they hove in the communol experience of western culture over centuries 1 express fundamental volues thot lie neor the core of the morol identity of this culture . When we soy thot there should be o ju st couse for resort to ormed force 1 this is o woy of soying thot coercion by ormed force is not morolly neu t ral but needs to be just ified by some grove reoson; when we soy thot the resort to force should be o lost resort ond should be oimed ot producing peoce 1 this is o woy of expressing o bios towords peoce insteod of war ond toword s the solution of disputes by non-militory meons where possible ; when we soy thot horm to noncombotonts should be ovoided 1 this is an offirmotion to the ideo thot people who do not themselves directly couse horm should not hove horm directed ot them; ond so on for oll of the nine mojor onolyticol cotegories or criterio of just war trodition.
Just war trodition is not 1 controry to much populor usoge 1 o 'doctrine'. Rother it is the res ult of the combinotion of mony doctrines from vorious theoreticol ond existential perspectives over o history many centuries long. The proper use of this trodition for morol guidonce requires entering the circle of witnesses provided by this history 1 toking seriously both whot they ogree upon in common ond the elements of difference or tension omong them 1 olong with the reosons for s uch difference. In this woy the debotes of the post con be brought to beor on the debotes of the present.
A Critigue of Nucleor Deterrence Strotegy
The s t rotegy of nucleor deterrence is often represented os o meons of defense 1 but it is more properly described os an effort to dete r ottock by threotening unocceptoble domoge in retoliotion for such ottock . Defense 1 os understood in just war tradition and in military and political parlance prior to the nuclear age, referred to measures designed to prevent an attack from succeeding. A strategy of defense, then, in this sense, would be one of denial of victory to the attacker. Such a strotegy defines force structures, types of weopons, ond deployment potterns designed to be used ogoinst enemy forces deployed ogoinst them, ond it implies militory reseorch ond development ariented toward improving such 'wor-fighting' copocity. Such o strotegy also nas a deterrent aspect, however, along with its 'wor-fighting' thrust: no prospective enemy, when counting his own costs ond meosuring his own likelihood of success, could be expected rotionolly to set an armed conflict in motion knowing that he was unlikely to succeed or thot the costs of success would be unacceptably high.
In ony cose, nucleor deterrence strategy in the braod form it hos taken over the post forty yeors is o strategy of retoliotion, not of defense; it aims at punishing the enemy for horm olreody given, not at warding off the horm os it is being dealt out ond preventing its effects from being feit on the volues of the society being defended . The difference con be seen in the simple realization thot, should deter rence b y th reat of u nocceptoble punishment foil ond o nuclear attock be la u nched, no omount of ofter -thefoct retoliotion would prevent severe darnage to the saciety ar sacieties to be defended ond forfeiture of volues that were ostensibly protected by the realiatary threat. A strotegy of defense by victory -deniol, however, still moy operote to protect such societies and their volues even after deterrence breoks down ond ormed conflict begins.
The org ument is often mode that nucleor retoliotion strotegy hos been dictated by the nature of the technalagy of nucleor weopons. On this widely populor orgument there could be no other strategy thon one bosed on th reot of retoliotion for u se of n ucleor weopon s ond for p rotection ogoinst their use on western societies. This is, however, an oversimplificotion that overlooks the major volue ossumptions thot hove also offected the shope of strategic nucleor doctrine. Concepts of nuclear weopons and their use hove evolved in United States doctrine in a direct line from the concepts ossocioted with strategic bombing in Warld ·War II. The occeptonce of counter -city bombing in this war rested, in turn, on the experience of counter -city bombardment in the first World War. Admittedly, in oll these coses technology was o significont foctor: for example, the inobility of weapons delivery systems to discriminate closely enough to ollow ovoidonce of horm to noncombotonts even if desired. But an importont shift in values also occurred which was not itself driven by technology. This was an erosion of the morol ideal of protecting noncombatonts so fo r as possible in war. In the World War II debotes aver strotegic bombing this erosion of the ideal of noncombotont immunity oppeored in the ideo thot oll citizens of the enemy stote were themselves one's enemies, ond that it was o proper act of war to attock the militory capobilities of troops in line of bottle by ottocking the morole of civilions at home. This shift in morol volues was symbolized by the new concept of 'the home front' olongside the old one of 'the bottle front' . 4
Strategie nucleor retoliotory doctrine, then, os it developed ofter World War II , corried forword tendencies ond ossumption s olreody shoped in that war and earlier, ond it rests on o mix thot includes ideological as weil as technological factors. Rather than the one driving the other, there has been o mutual Interaction of the two. The decision to use the original otomlc bombs ogainst cities in which civilian ond militory elements were mixed was preceded ond influenced by o history of conventionol Countercity bombing; it was the perceived Iack of morol problem with such bombing thot mode such u se of the otomic bombs seem right, not the technology of the bombs or their delivery systems . ( Indeed, the first delivery systems were t he some monned bombers thot hod been used for strotegic bombing wi t h conventionol high explosives. Only the form of the explosive was different, ond the convention of meosuring the destructive copobility of nuclear weopon s in terms of equivolent tonnoge of TNT shows the desire, in strotegic terms, to assimilate the new forms of weoponry to the old.) Loter in the nuclear ·age, o similar volue orientotion led to the development of fu sion worheod s of massive destructive power. The combined technologicol foctors of the destructiveness of these worheods ond the inoccuracy of eorly ballistic delivery systems meont that the only reasonoble strotegy t hot could hove been developed araund them was o counter -city one; yet the morol decision that it was justified to torget populotion centers was an Independent one thot hod olreody been mode in eorlier contexts (see Freedmon 1981 , chs. 4, 15-16, ond passim, ond Mandelbaum 1979 .
In just war terms, the direct, intentional torge ting of noncombatants is immorol. This foct informs contemporory just war theorizing in o vorie t y of woys. Poul Romsey, in books published in 1961 ond 1968, orgued that while direct, intentional torgeting of noncombotonts is morolly wrang, this is not the some os soying thot ony horm to noncombotonts in o war renders the war unjust. Rother, Romsey r eosoned by use of the morol rule of double effect, if the octuol tor get ( soy, o militor y bose or o missile site) is legitimote, then indirect, unintentionol horm to noncombotonts moy be allowed, though there is still an obligation to ovoid such horm where possible. This line of reosoning hos an obviou s force, though it eventuolly runs into difficulty: when scores of multi-megotennage nucleor worheods are torgeted on legitimote militory objectives in ond araund a particulor populotion center (see Bishops, § 81 ), common sense connot discriminote between the intention to ottock those legitimote objectives directly ond the intention to ottock the densely pocked noncombotant populotion in the sur r ounding orea. Indeed, in such o context an oppeol to the rule of double effect to justify such torgeting moy be indistinguishoble from mere rotiocination. Use of the rule of double effect in the context of torgeting of mossively destructive worheods delivered on militory targets in the midst of population centers does not sotisfy just war concerns for the protection of noncombatonts.
In their 1983 postoral the Americon Cotholic bishops recognized the immorolity of direct, intentional ottocks on noncombotonts ond expressed skepticism thot u se of strotegie nucleor weopons would not vialote noncoml?otont irrmunity; yet their ottempt to resolve the morol issue was for from satisfoctory. The Chollenge of Peoce distinguished between deterrence by threot of nucleor retoliotion ond octuol ~ of strotegie nuclear weopons . Such o threot, the bishops reasoned, is morally occeptoble, though corrying out the threat by an actual counter-population strike would be morally wrang ( § § 188, 190) . This rather ingenious bit of rationalization has already been the object of much debate. I have never found it the least bit persuasive, either as a moral argument or as a base for sound strotegie thinking. Morolly speoking, it is for from convincing to orgue thot it is acceptoble to threoten to blow up onother's house (along with his entire family and next-door neighbors) as a means to keep him from blowing up your own. This is, I am convinced, an immorol threot whether or not you octuolly intend to do what you threaten or possess the copobility to do so. Yet the threot would not be credible were the capobility to do so not in place; thus the dependence on the threat requires the existence of the copobility to do what is threatened. In the case of strategic nucleor weopons, that capability implies the actual deployment and targeting of bollistic missiles.
The Ameriean bishops were right to argue thot, on the theoretical Ievel, there is a moral distinction between the threat to use these missiles and the actual use of them: it is the distinction between a lesser and a greater evil. This theoretieal distinction, though, does not translote into an octuol difference on the Ievel of practical morality and concrete deterrence strategy. A nuclear strategy based on the threot to retaliate without the copability to corry through on that threat ond the embodied intention to do so would not long remoin credible. To ottempt to redefine the morol issue by separation of t hreat from use does not, then, resolve the moral problems inherent in use of nuclear weapons of the current strategic types. lndeed, if anything, it drows attention oll the more sharply to these moral problems.
The current strategy of deterrence is in fact, os I orgued obove, o strotegy bosed on the credible threot of retoliotory punishment. In just war terms there is nothing inherently immorol obout o strategy of punishment, despite the modern trend toword o morol rhetorie representing the only just couse for use of ormed force to be defense. What determines whether it is wrong or not is the nature of the punishment ond who receives it. Given a strategy t hat rests, today as in the post, on multimegaton nuclear warheads and a targeting doctrine that accepts multiple strikes on military targets inside centers of noncombatant population, neither appeal to the rule of double effect nor the effort to separate the deterrent threat from the retaliatory action itself can overcome the immorality inherent in such a strategy.
I argued earlier that the main line of nuclear strategy was driven by value assumptions as weil as by the technology of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Had the force of the moral ideal of noncombatont immunity not already eroded before the odvent of the nuclea r age, I doubt whether it would have seemed so right or so inevitable that nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy should have developed as they have. Similarly, if that moral ideal is now to be recovered and reasserted , this must imply changes in the nature of strategic doctrine, t argeting policy, ond in the weapons of defense and deter r ence themselves.
Other moral concerns from just war tradition also point toward the need to make such changes. Current strategic doctrine and weaponry do not, as noted above, provide a defense of volues against an attack in progress but are suited only to deter attack. lronically, carrying through the threatened punishment might, under some circumstances, itself serve to complete the destruction of the values ostensibly being preserved and protected. ( This would be the case, for exomple, in a scenario in which a Soviet flrs t strike was beneath the Ievel necessary to produce a 'nuclear winter', while the oddition of an Americon retoliatory strike would exceed this Ievel.) Again, though it is always difficult to quantify good and evil, the mognitude of destruction that could be reasonably expected from a strategic nuclear exchange calls into question whether a war fought in this way could ever not cause a disproportion of bad over good. Nuclear pacifists, though they typically deride just war theory as irrelevant to t he nuclear oge, have regulorly argued their position in terms of this just war criterion. Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder, for example, has argued explicitly that faced with adding disproportionate harm to disproportionate harm, the more moral course for Americans in event of a nuclear war would be simply to surrender (Yoder 1984, 64-67 ) .
We moy put the matter more positively by turning the critical focus of just war tradition araund to ask what sort of strategic posture is compatible with the moral concerns found here. in the first place, a bias toward defen se rat her than offense runs through just war t radition as a whole, and it is especially strong, as noted earlier, in modern international law. Taken seriously, this implies development of weopons that are capable of providing genuine defense against attack, not only retaliatory punishment for attack. Second, there is a bias toward weaponry that is inherently not disproportionately destructive and capable of being used discriminately agoinst legitimate military torgets. 5 This implies lowering the destructive copability of nuclear weapons, replocing ot least some nuclear weopons with conventionol ones, and increasing the occuracy and controllability of delivery systems.
in the following sections I will opply these standards of meosurement to two new strotegic developments, the strotegic defense initiative, or SDI, ond froctional-megotonnoge, high -occurocy strotegic nuclear weopons.
The Case of SDI The Strategie Defense Initiative, or SDI, has emerged as a central issue of disogreement between the United $totes and the Soviet Union in the areno of orms control. This is not necessorily the most important thing to say obout it, however, from a moral per spective based in just war tradition.
Arms control os such, as this is currently understood to mean Iimits on numbers and types of weapons, particulorly strotegic weopons, is not an end in itself, from a perspective within this tradition; it is, rather, at best a meons to ends thot ore themselves morolly justifioble.
Focusing on ends, not meons, also shifts the debate over Iabaratory research versus testing versus deployment into o perspective different from that of the arms controllers. lf strotegic defense is itself morally justifiable, or justifiable in some forms but not in others, then oll Ievels of work from research to deployment are justified. lf the judgment is reoched thot strotegic defense weopons systems, or some such weopons, ore morolly unjust, then earlier stoges of work -ond in particulor, Iabaratory research -may still be justified if there is the possibility of producing morol benefits. Since most of the public debote hos been carried on in terms of the narrow perspectives of orms control, these brooder ond more fundamental moral concerns have been lorgely disregarded.
Moral analysis of SDI is complicated by two further factors. First, ottempts at moral justification have been o port of the SDI debote, on both sides, since its inception. Thus o just war anolysis will inevitobly Iook, ot times, like an effort to toke sides in the debote that is olreody under woy, rother thon o fresh attempt to evoluote SDI in morol terms. Nonetheless, it is importont to conduct such o just war onolysis, for doing so, olong with providing o vehicle for judging SDI, also implicitly provides o perspective from which to judge the ostensibly morol cloims thot hove olreody been odvonced regording this progrom.
A secend complicoting foctor is the question of exoctly what the term SDI meons. President Reogon's initiol rhetoric, in his address of March 23, 1983, seemed to hold out the promise of o defensive shield copoble of protecting the Americon people os o whole. Advertisements in support of SDI aired on Americon television for a time in 1985 reinforced this Image, employing a voice-over technique while on the screen appeared a drawing like that of a young child in which a rainbow-like shield protected a hause agains t incoming misslies. The actual shape of authorized SDI planning , though, so far as this can be made out from unclassified materials and public statements of mHitary and Administration spokespersons quolified to speak an SDI, is much mar e selective: for technical and economic reasons cu r rent planning is focu sed on the pos sibilities held out by SDI for reinforcing the su rvivab ility of the American strategic retaliatory force. 6
These are not neces sarily contradictory concepts. One way of arguing for their complementarity is to describe the narrewer version of SDI as the short-term goal, an Initial step toward the implementation of the broader vision. Since admittedly the SDI program will be very expensive to bring to the deployment stage, and s ince it is dependent on extremely complex technology some of which is now only in the experimental stage, on this argument the proper first step ls not to attempt to Implement the brooder counter-populotion shield in the first generation of space-based st rategic defenses but to reserve that goal for subsequent generations of such defense systems. In this argument the high maral goal of counterpopulation defense is implicitly honored, but its realization is postponed for technological and economic reosons. A familiar operative rule of maral analysis is that no one is marally obligated to do something that is beyond his or her power; that rule is implicitly observed in this argument.
A second type of argument for the complementarity of the broader and narrewer concepts of SDI is somewhat more complex, ond it sharply shift s t he ground of the moral reasoning regarding SDI. This argument is that the narrewer version of SDI is valuable as an enhancement of strategic deterrence by threat of retaliatory punishment. By increasing the survivability of the American land-based strategic nuclear force SDI would reduce the possibility of a Soviet first strike, since that strike would be less punishing and a heavy retaliatory blow thus much more likely. We should recognize that this is a rather different kind of argument from the first one and is in tension with it. The first orgument accepts the ideal of counterpopulation strategic defense, and a Counterforce shield is understood as a first step toward that goal. The second, like oll of the main line of deterrence strategy throughout its forty-year history, focuses not on counterpopulation defense against an ottack in progress but rother on preventing such an at tack from occuring in the first place by increasing the credibility of the threat of an unacceptably destructive retaliatory strike.
What of the connection between the narrewer and broader defensive shields, according to this second argument? The answer, simply put, is that the concept of a full protective population shield is jettisoned.
Population p r otection 1 on this orgument 1 depends on the continuotion of credible deterrence 1 ond thot rests on o retoliotory threot. Given an Initial limited SOl copobility to protect the s trotegic retoliotory force 1 o loter broodening of . SOl copobility would s till be first of oll for the purpose of enhoncing such protection. Same degree of increosed populotion defense might will be o result of such o more capable sytem 1 but it would be a secondory resu lt from the steps taken to reoch the primory gool.
In short 1 the two lines of argument for SOl thot I have sketched 1 tagether with their impllcations 1 Iead squarely into o debote of lang standing over the merits of defense os opposed to those of deterrence. Arguments opposed to SOl also Iead toward this debate 1 though principolly by one path only: the path thot ossumes the volldity of deterrence doctrine and discounts the ideal of populotion defense.
Wor-ovoidance is certoinly o mojor theme in just war tradition 1 and it is the fundamental purpose embodied in the structure of strategie deterrence by threot of retaliation . Whot is morally problemotic obout this form of strotegic deterrence is its foilure to deol constructively with the eventuality that it might 1 under some conditions 1 fall to prevent a war from storting. In that eventuality it is reasonoble to e xpect thot the strotegic nucleor weapons possessed by both sides would be used 1 with mojor destructive effect on noncornbatonts (including citizens of nonbelligerent stotes) even in the case of the most scrupulously discriminating choice of torgets. The morol dilemmo posed by relionce on strotegic deterrence by threat of retaliotion is t hot in cose of the foilure of deterrence to ovoid war 1 the resulting conflict would likely be oll the more destructive becouse of t he use of the very weopons -Strategie nucleor missiles -that were never supposed to have to be used.
So-colled 'wor -fighting' plonning is 1 by cantrast, weckest in terms of its obility to ovoid war altogether ond strengest in its purpose pf continuing to defend threotened volues in the midst of an ormed conflict. There is an importont deterrent or wor-ovoiding element to such a strotegic configurotion1 though its effect is generally downployed by its critics; the oim here is deterrence by threot of denial of vietory.
Moral ond strategie concerns tend to converge, then 1 on the problern of the optimum mix in defense plonning of wor-avoidonce (deterrence) ond wor-fighting (octive defense of values). Strategie defense offer s new possibilities in both these regords. lts actuol capabilities remoin unproven 1 and other means to optimizing these twin concerns may prove better 1 but it is worthwhile nonetheless to exomine SOl in this light.
The mojor claimed benefit for the more lilnited fo rm of strategic deterrence is thot it wou ld improve the survivobility of Americon lond-bosed ICBMs, cu rrently vulnerable to o fi rst strike (see, for exomple, Brzezinski/ Jos t row/Kompelmon 1985). Not only would this in principle enhonce t he oim of wor-ovoidonce. Since the weopons thot would be protected include precisely those t hot would be most copoble of being used in occord wit h t he just wor principles of discriminotion ( noncombotont immunity ) ond proportion, this would be o positive development in jus in bello te rms os weil.
On the negative side, it hos been orgued by c ritics of SOl thot it would be provocotive ond destobilizing. In on orticle titled "Oork Side of 'Star Wors' : System Could Al so Attock " The New York Times {Mar ch 1985, p . I A 24) summorized some critics' feors obout the offensive copobility of spoce-bosed Iosers: t hey might be used to "deliver devostoting non-nucleo r strikes to high-volue torgets onywhere on the earth's surfoce, in t he oir or in spoce, ... with no colloterol domoge to odjocent civilion populotions." 'Key torge t s' might include oil tonke rs ot seo, petroleum s toroge depots on lond, power tronsformers, militory vehicles, troops, ond even groin field s ond storoge bins. A much more recent ort icle (October 19, 1986 , pp. I, 14} st otes thot, for t echnicol r eosons, "spoce-bosed Iosers hove been obondoned", ond if t rue this re nders the obove argument ogoins t SOl moot. Nonet heles s , we should dwell o moment on the longuoge of t he critic quoted. From o just wor perspective it would be o decided odvontoge, not o disodvontoge, to be oble to deliver non-nucleo r strikes ogoinst legitimote militory torgets withou t colloteral domoge to odjocent civilion populotions . Given thot todoy's nuclear missiles con destroy high -volue torgets onywhere on t he globe but ot the cost of such colloterol domoge, o spocebosed loser would be o much more morolly defensible weopon in terms of the ideols of discriminotion ond p r oportionolity.
The most significont benefits, indeed, potentiolly offered by SOl lie in t he reg ion of wor-fighting meons ond methods, the oreno of the just wor jus in bello. lf t here wos ever o weapon inherently offensive in chorocter, it is the multi-megoton nucleor worheod. While there ore certoinly offensive possibilities for the more exotic new technologies being reseorched for SOl -notobly Iosers ond porticle beoms -t hese possibilities could scorcely pose worse problems t hon those of strotegic nucleor weopons now deployed. Less exotic technologies -for exomple, the use of ont imissile missiles and 'smart roc ks' -pose no inherent offen sive t hreot; they ore pu rely defensive by their nature.
For just wor trodition, t hough, the most fundomentot issues in the worfighting contex t ore define d b y the morol c riterio of discriminotion ond proportionolity. These criterio imply the development ond deployment of weapons that are highly aeeurate 1 limited in their eollateral effeets 1 and maximally subjeet to human eontrol.
Applying these guidelines to partieular weapons or weapons systems requires eomparing them to rival weapons or systems 1 and it requires setting them in the eontext of their strategic and taetical purpose. Thus 1 for example 1 eompared to the taetical fission worheods thot they replaeed 1 and in the strategie and taetieal eontext of their intended use 1 the miniaturized fusion ('enhoneed rodiation' or 'neutron') warheads now deployed in NATO forces ore marolly superior because of their lessened eollateral domage due to blost ond long-lived rodiation effects. Sinee conventlonol weopons oble to perform . the same functions would likely cause for mare blast ond fire domage thon the enhanced radiation warheads 1 there may even be an edge in favor of the lotter here. Similarly 1 o high accuraey (low CEP) ballistic or cruise missile is marally superior to one less accurate because it can, in principle 1 be used mare diseriminatingly (that is 1 so as better to ovoid eolloterol noneombatant horm from a strike ogoinst o eombotont torget). Moreover 1 since for effeetiveness ogoinst a given target the size of the warhead can deerease as accuracy increases 1 t he low-CEP weapon moy also be mare oble to satisfy the moral requirement of proportionality (for further development of this line of reosoning see Johnson 1984 1 112-21 1 138-48).
Measured against strategie nuclear weopons 1 the systems t hat are projeeted as part of SDl more closely eonform to the eriteria of discrimination and proportionality. They are to be Counterforce weopons by design 1 ond their eolloteral effeet on noncombatants when used in this manner would 1 so for os can be told1 be nil. Even if they were used in o eounter-population mode 1 as the critic quoted eorlier hos suggested they might be 1 the effects of a thermonuclear explosion would be far less diseriminote and for more disproportionately destruetive of noneombatant Jives and values.
These reflections opply to both the narrower and broader coneeptions of strategie defense os defined earlier. lt is not neeessary to imogine a defensive sereen over the whole of Amerieon society -difficult or impossible to achieve by current teehnology or thot projeeted for the next decode -to reeognize thot, in terms of the cotegories of just war tradition 1 strategie defense is morolly superior to a continued relianee on strategic nuclear deterrenee as the moin line of the west's effort to proteet and preserve its volues.
lmprovements in Nuclear Missiles
Moral responsibility does not end when a wor begins; rather 1 with the onset of ormed conflict a new dimension to that responsibility opens up: the need to fight so as to effectively proteet and preserve the values be-ing fought for without using methods and meons that would themselves coll those volues into question. The jus in bello of just wor trodition, in coolescing araund the importonce of ovoiding horm to noncombotonts ond limiting the destructiveness of meons of force employed, itself is o stotement of volue .
The principle of noncombotont immunity is o porticulor crystollizotion of the more fundamental morol conception that it is not right to horm the innocent. This principle is, for the jus in bello, what the ideo of ju st cou se is for the ju s od bell um. Those who moy be opposed by force ore thus those who themselves ore doing wrong by force. Combotants do such wrong; noncombotants do not. Whatever their own sympothies may be assumed to be, then, the noncombotont populotion of an enemy stote in wartime do not give up their moral stotus unless they themse lves toke up arms or move into positions of close support to those who octuolly beor arms. It is sometimes cloimed thot in modern war there ore no noncombotants. This moy be simply the orgument thot ottitudes, not octions, moke enemies, and t hot in a modern state it moy be ossumed thot the civilian populotion wonts their nation to win in war, just os do the soldiers in arms. Yet the antipothetic attitude of onother does not in itself justify my using ormed force ogainst him, much less kill him.
7 Or the orgument that in modern war there ore no noncombotonts moy be based on the alleged close ties of the civilian ond military sectors in modern economics. The worker ot a plant that mokes ball beorings used in tonks does not hirnself beor orms, but he is nonetheless directly oiding the war effort. The answer to this line of orgument is, of course, different depending on the type of e xomple given. Yet even if the worker in ques tion is a combotant, his bedridden fother ot home is not, nor his wife who hos smoll children at home, nor those children. Broodening the category of combotants to include people in civilian clothes ond civilion jobs like that of the ball-bearing worker does not do owoy with the fact that, in a modern society os weil os in ony in the post, there remoin some persans and closses of persans who ore genuinely noncombotants, to whom is owed a morol du ty not to give direct and intentional horm.
The jus in bello principle of proportionolity also echoes the morol concerns encopsuloted in the ju s od bellum. This principle reminds us that the justificotion of use of ormed force does not extend to the infliction of grotuitous destruction or t he estoblishment of a Corthaginian peoce. This just war concept does not meon, as is sometimes orgued, opposing force with like or equol force to produce a stolemote; nor does it imply only defensive configurations ond u se of military force. 8 Rother it mean s simply thot, if o porticulor militory objective is justified, then the force employed to ottoin it should be the minimum consistent with that object. Anything more is gratuitous.
8oth these morol principles from the just war jus in bello point in the some direction. Weapons of war should be, by design, highly controlloble ond relotively limited in their destructive effects. For noncombotont irrmunity, controllobility meons the ability to disc r iminote between legitimote torgets ond noncombotants in the irrmediate oreo, while Iimitation of destructiveness meons both minimizing the colloterol deoths ond darnage thot will occur around the target and also minimizing the Iang-term effects of the domoge that will linger ofter the end of the war, when oll ore noncombotants. For proportionality, controllobility meons the ability to match countermeasures more precisely to threats, and limited destructiveness means the ability to neutralize o threat without grot uitous destruction to nearby volues it would be weil to preserve.
The obove considerotions ore not new; Poul Romsey odvonced very similar orguments in his first book on nucleor war published in 1961, reosoning from them to the morol prefer obility of Counterforce over counterpopulation (countervolue) torgeting of nucleor weapons (Ramsey 1961, 148-49, 228-29, 232-33, 260-64, 320-23; cf. Walzer 1977 , eh . 17, ond O'Brien 1981 . When the octuol weapons that might be torgeted in a counterforce mode ore considered, however, it quickly becomes apparent that, for multi-megaton warheads, even if delivered by vehicles with a reosonoble occurocy, in proctical terms there will be no difference between torge ting o military Installation in the center of o concentratlon of noncombotont populotion ond torgeting that noncombotant population itself. lf we wish to take seriously such o r eolizotion while mointoining a corrmitment to the morol Ideals of proportionality and noncombotont irrmunity, there ore but o few alternative woys to do so. I ) We moy identify nuclear weopons os a dass with indiscriminate ond disproportionate destruction ond decide that therefore no circumstances exlst in which they cou ld be used morally. Token in one direction, this poth Ieads to total nuclear disarmoment. Token onother way, it Ieads to the position of the American Catholic bishops that deterrence by threot of nucleor retoliation is morolly permissible, but the retaliotion that ls threotened would not be morol to corry out. Locking such generat disarmoment and recognizing t he implausibility thot threot ond use con be separated os the American bishops desired, this woy of deoling with the moral issue leoves o great deol wonting.
2) We moy orgue, as Romsey did in 1961, that the important morol concern is to ovoid direct, intentional ottacks on noncombotonts . Ramsey employed the rule of double effect to orgue thot where horm to noncombotants is an indirect, unintended secondory effect of o legitimote militor y oction, then it is excused. This mokes onother distinction, like thot between threot ond use mode by the American Catholic bishops, thot is more persuasive in theoreticol than in practical context. Though militory ond combotont civilion Installotions in or neor o given city moy be t he direct torgets, for the cose of multi-megoton weopons it is implousible to separate the Intention of crippling these torgets from thot of horming the noncombotont populotion in the immediate vicinity. Where the oreo of destruction extends out from the point of detonotion to include o hundred squore miles or more, to coll thot destruction 'secondory' ond 'unintended' is to twist the meonings of those words beyond reoson.
3) We moy decide to Iimit our use of such weopons to torgets in unpopuloted or sporsely populoted oreos, such os o novol bottle group ot seo or missile silos locoted in remote oreos. In morol terms this would be obout the Iimit of oppropriote use of very !arge nucleor weopons, ond o torge ting plan for such weopons should ot the very least give prio~ity to this concept. Yet such torgeting olone would be o severe restriction on the octuol use of nucleor weopons, ond it is not likely thot without exponsion of the torget Iist beyond the bounds of discriminotion ond proportionolity this could provide either o warkable dete rrence or o warkable wor -fighting plan. As one critic of strotegic nucleor weopons hos orgued, "if you toke the eitles out of the war-plan, there's no war-plan left" (Powers 1984, 55) .
4)
We might choose to aceeierote development ond deployment of alternative types of weopons oble to reploce those thot ore by design incopoble of being used ogoinst most legitimote torgets without being indiscriminote ond disproportionote. This would include delivery systems of very low CEP moted to either froctionol megotonnoge nucleor worheods or conventionol high-explosive worheods. Since reseor ch ond development, ond some deployment, of such systems hos olreody been under woy for some time, the decision to seek the solution to the morol dilemmo of how to protect volues worth defending by just meons is not just an expression of an ideal; it ls rother the choice of an option for both deterrence ond posslble wor -fighting thot ot once drows us closer to the gools of discriminotion ond proportion in our use of militory force ond to whot is octuolly possible in weopons technology ond force configurotions built araund it.
Counter -force torgeting is, in short , implied by just war concerns. Yet without meons copoble of being employed ogoinst forces without indiscriminote ond d isproportionote colloterol horm to volues, odoption of the counter -force ideal remoins empty of real con tent ond, ot bottom, o morol shom. Weoponry copoble of being used in o counter -force mode without such indiscriminote ond disproportionote effects, tagether with strotegy ond toctlcs thot moximize the obility of such weoponry to keep the use of militory force within these morol Iimit s, is o direct implicotion of toking seriously the requirements of the ju s in bello of just wor trodition. Now, how does reolity -whot is currently the cose ond whot is reosonobly expected to be possible in the neor future -fit with this morol gool? Unlike the cose of SDI, where most of the technology is still in the stoge of reseorch ond much of it is new ond untried, the move toword low-CEP delivery vehicles ond froctionol megotonnoge nucleor worheods is olreody weil under woy in western forces. Another foctor is whether the intended torge t is 'hord' or 'soft' . Counternueiear-force torgeting must ossume 'hord' torgets, thot is, reinforced concrete missile silos. Agoinst such torgets the CEP-yield rotio is cruciol, for whot motters is producing the blast pressure necessory to fr octure the silo ond render its missile inoperable. High-CEP weopons thus correlote with high yields ond use of multiple wor heods per target. (CEP, ofter oll, is o meosure of probable error, ond o given missile moy fall ou t side the overoge CEP rodius, where it will foil to ochieve the desi red effect. )
Replocement of low-occurocy (high-CEP), high-yield weopons with newer types of high occurocy ond commensurotely lower yield hos benefits in terms of the jus in bello concepts even when the target is in o remote areo. After the Chernobyl disoster it is absurd to minimize the effect of nucleor follout on populotions even hundreds of miles owoy. Similorly, the otmospheric detonotion of o high-yield strotegic nucleor worheod, even if used in o counterforce mode ogoinst o remotely locoted silo, will inevitobly produce Counterpopulation effects in the form of r odiooctive follout in oreos far r emaved from the target silo. ln the real world of nuclear strategy we must magnify these effects by two (since typically two warheads are assigned to each hord torget), multiply by the number of hord torgets, then odd the number of soft targets agoinst which a single worheod will suffice. The result is massive noncombatont devostotion, which is immarol even if we do not go so for os to postulote nucleor winter or, in Jonathan Schell's terms, "o republic of insects ond grass" (the phrase is the title of eh. 1 in Schell 1982) .
By cantrast, incr easing occurocy of delivery vehicles (lowering the CEP) allows lowering the yield of the worheod, since the desired blast pressu r e ogoinst hard torgets can be hod with lower yield when the plocement of the worheod is mare precise. The increose in accu rocy may also make it possible to use only one, not two, worheods per hord target. Using a CEP of .015 nauticol miles end o desired blast pressure of 5000 pounds per squore inch, but still ossuming two worheods per hord torget, a recent orticle puts the necessary yield ot 1.2 kilotons (.0012 megatons) for eoch such tar get (Altfried/Cimbala 1985, 10) . Again, here we a r e in t he range of conventional high explosive . Yet even without substituting high.-explosive warheads for nuclear ones, there is a vast difference between the collateral harm caused by a nuclear explosion of .0012 megatons end one of .670 megatons (thot is, two of the Americon Mk-12A warheads mentioned above), Iet clone one of 40 megotons (two of the 20-megoton Soviet warheods mentioned above) . Even if we do not assume that targets in or near noncombatont population centers are amang those chosen for actual destruction, there is a clear imperative, for persans concerned with the maral right of noncombotants to protection in war, t o develop Counterforce weaponry that will produce the lowest yield possible, thus producing the lowest collateral harm to noncombotants consistent with destruction of the legitimate targets .
Conclusion
Just war thinking remeins relevant in the contemporary world. It could hardly be done away with in any cose, becouse it is part of the culturol heritoge of the west ond e xpresses o long-term historicol consensus an when volues should be protected by resort to force end whot kinds of force ore oppropriote for the protection of volue. In other words, this trodition teils us something of who we a r e ond whot we hold deor, ond without it our culture would be different in woys difficult to imagine. But mare thon this, the trodition holds implications for present morol onalysis ond decisions affecting the future which we would be ill-advised to ignore. Contemporary militory onalysis is full to the brim with unidimensional orguments. The orms control community ottempts to reduce everything to whot helps or hinders orms control; members of the deterrence community focus on whot is perceived by them os creoting greoter deterrent stobility or impoarang thot stobility; nucleor pocifists hote weopons of ony kind os such ond volue disormoment ot whotever cost; extreme howks work for overkill copobility whotever the result thot might follow in cose of war. So often in recent debote the issues hove been stoted in terms of the volue of deterrence over defense, the volue of second-strike weopons (by definition too low in occurocy to be useful in o first strlke, but also high in yield os o result of their CEP) over those thot could be useful in o first strike. Just war trodition helps to return the morol debote to fundamentals: there moy be expected to be occoslons in which the only woy to protect the volues we hold deor is by use of militory force, ond it is justifled to seek to protect these volues by force in such coses; yet not ony ond oll kinds of militory force moy morolly be employed, since some would result in destroying those volues themselves. Defense of volues, not offensive endongerment of the volues of others, is o blas in just war trodition. Avoidonce of horm to noncombotonts ond of disproportionote, grotuitous destruction ore also bioses within this trodition. The trodition further serves os o reminder thot we live in world in which t he end of oll waroll threot to volue by force -is not o reolity, so thot it is wrong to pretend thot it is. It reminds us, finolly, thot we must moke concrete judgments regording weopons, strotegies, ond toctics to seek to optimize the goods we seek to preserve. I hove orgued thot just war considerotions tend to produce o positive ossessment of the strotegic defense initiative ond thot they very definitely point to odoption of low-CEP, froctionol megotonnoge nucleor weopons. Neither of these is good in itself; yet in the real world of human history we must compore them to the strotegies ond weoponry of nucleor deterrence os this hos existed up to now. The morol choices reoched from this perspective will not Iook ottroctive to mony persans whose prior commitments lock them within norrower points of view.
Nor will the relotlvity of the morol choices implied by just war considerotions be ottroctive to persans gripped by o utopion vision of o world in which there is no violence. The contemporory relevonce of just war trodition nevertheless perseveres.
Notes
The 1928 Poet of Paris, the 'ogreement to outlow war', outlowed only fir st resort to force to settle · international dlsputes; it did not abridge the rlght of use of force in self-defense. Similorly, the United Notions Charter, in Articles 2 ond 51, restricts the first use of force while continuing to reserve the right of second -defensive -use. For discussion see Meyrowitz 1970; Kaplan/Kotzenbach 1966; ond pp. 266-70 in my 1975. 2 The 1982 conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentino over the Folklonds/Molvinas Islands is a cose in point. 8oth parties to this conflict argued that they were defending their own rights. Yet Argentina also justified its seizure of the Falklands/Molvinas as recovery of territory wrongly token over by the British a hundred and fifty years earlier, ond Britain in turn justified its military response as action to retoke lost territory that was its own. Prime Minister Thatcher and her representatives also made much of the need to punish military aggression, while an undertone rose from among third-world countries that Argentino's action hod been right because it was punishment of British colonialism. Here we hove oll three of the dassie just causes (defense, recovery of something wrongly taken, punishment of evil) enumerated by Thomas Aquinas. Yet international law explicitly legitimizes only defense, ond whatever the moral force of the other arguments, the legal cose had to be put in these terms.
3 It is, of course, a major theme in onti-nuclear writing to argue for the inherent disproportionality of nucleor weopons, as in, for example, Schell 1982 . A more moderate position, nonetheless resting heavily on the argument from the disproportionality of such weapons, is exemplified by The Chollenge of Peace; see paragraphs 152-53, 180, 184, 189. 4 Paul Ramsey comments on the need to recover "the memory distinction" between combatants and noncombotonts; see his chops. 7, 17. On the linkage between the justification of strotegic bombing in War li ond nucleor strotegy after 1945 see Freedmon 1981, chapter I; cf. my 1984, 129-38 . 7 Whether o given individual is a combatant or not depends on octions, not attitudes . In the eighteenth century Emmerich de Vottel put the argument this way: "Women, children, the sick and oged, are in the number of enemies. • • . But these ore member s (of the enemy society) who make no resistonce, and consequently give us no right to treat their persons ill, or use ony violence agoinst them, much less to take owoy their Jives." (Vattel 1916, Book !li, section 145) 
